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ospf6d: CVE-2011-3324 (DD LSA assertion)

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This vulnerability (CERT-FI #514839) was reported by CROSS project.

When Database Description LSA header list contains trailing zero octets,
ospf6d tries to process this data as an LSA header. This triggers an
assertion in the code and ospf6d shuts down.

* ospf6_lsa.c
  * ospf6_lsa_is_changed(): handle header-only argument(s)
    appropriately, do not treat LSA length underrun as a fatal error.
This commit is contained in:
Denis Ovsienko 2011-09-26 13:18:36 +04:00
parent 7177504338
commit 09395e2a0e
1 changed files with 11 additions and 1 deletions
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12
ospf6d/ospf6_lsa.c
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@ -163,9 +163,19 @@ ospf6_lsa_is_changed (struct ospf6_lsa *lsa1,
return 1;
if (ntohs (lsa1->header->length) != ntohs (lsa2->header->length))
return 1;
/* Going beyond LSA headers to compare the payload only makes sense, when both LSAs aren't header-only. */
if (CHECK_FLAG (lsa1->flag, OSPF6_LSA_HEADERONLY) != CHECK_FLAG (lsa2->flag, OSPF6_LSA_HEADERONLY))
{
zlog_warn ("%s: only one of two (%s, %s) LSAs compared is header-only", __func__, lsa1->name, lsa2->name);
return 1;
}
if (CHECK_FLAG (lsa1->flag, OSPF6_LSA_HEADERONLY))
return 0;
length = OSPF6_LSA_SIZE (lsa1->header) - sizeof (struct ospf6_lsa_header);
assert (length > 0);
/* Once upper layer verifies LSAs received, length underrun should become a warning. */
if (length <= 0)
return 0;
return memcmp (OSPF6_LSA_HEADER_END (lsa1->header),
OSPF6_LSA_HEADER_END (lsa2->header), length);